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COMMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSERVATION ORDERS
Introduction
The Office of Conservation within the Department of Natural
Resources of the state of Louisiana exercises the functions of the state
with respect to the regulation, conservation, and use of the state's
natural resources. It prevents the waste of oil, gas, geothermal
resources, and lignite and other forms of coal, through unitization and
avoidance of unnecessary recovery operations.' The Office of Conser-
vation is directed and controlled by the Commissioner of Conservation,'
who serves as Assistant Secretary for Conservation of the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources.' All natural resources not within the
jurisdiction of other state departments or agencies are within the
jurisdiction of the Office of Conservation,4 and the Commissioner main-
tains jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property
necessary to enforce effectively the laws relating to the conservation
of oil and gas.'
The Commissioner of Conservation is empowered with considerable
authority,' perhaps the most important of which is the power to make
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. LA. R.S. 36:358(C) (Supp. 1975). See also LA. R.S. 30:9 (1950) (waste of oil and
gas); LA. R.S. 30:800 (Supp. 1976) (geothermal resources); LA. R.S. 30:903 (Supp. 1976)
(lignite).
2. LA. R.S. 30:1(A) (1950).
3. LA. R.S. 36:357 (Supp. 1976).
4. LA. R.S. 30:1(C) (1950).
5. LA. R.S. 30:4(A) (1950).
6. LA. R.S. 30:4(B) (Supp. 1981) provides that in the exercise of his powers the
Commissioner has the following authority:
to collect data; to make investigations and inspections; to examine properties,
leases, papers, books, and records; to examine, survey, check, test, and gauge
oil and gas wells, tanks, refineries, and modes of transportation; to hold hearings;
to provide for the keeping of records and the making of reports; and to take
any action as reasonably appears to him to be necessary to enforce the [provi-
sions of title 30].
Whenever it appears to the Commissioner that any person has engaged in or is about
to engage in any act constituting a violation of title 30 or of any regulation, rule,
or order issued thereunder, the Commissioner may bring an action to enjoin such act
and to enforce compliance with the applicable rule, regulation, or order. Further, upon
a proper showing, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary or permanent in-
junction shall be granted without bond. The Commissioner is authorized to seek relief
which may include a mandatory injunction commanding the violator to comply with
the violated rule, regulation, or order, and to make restitution of money received in
violation of the rule, regulation, or order. Finally, the Commissioner may transmit
evidence of the violations to the district attorney having jurisdiction over the violator
for the institution of the necessary criminal proceedings. LA. R.S. 30:542 (Supp. 1973).
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any reasonable rules, regulations, and orders necessary in the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the provisions of title 30.' Delegating
7. LA. R.S. 30:4(C) (1950 & Supp. 1982) sets forth purposes for which the Com-
missioner may establish rules, regulations, or orders:
(1) To require the drilling, casing, and plugging of wells to be done in such
a manner as to prevent the escape of oil or gas out of one stratum to another;
to prevent the intrusion of water into oil or gas strata; to prevent the pollution
of fresh water supplies by oil, gas, or salt water; and to require reasonable bond
with security for the performance of the duty to plug each dry or abandoned well.
(2) To require the making of reports showing the location of all oil and
gas wells, and the filing of logs, electrical surveys, and other drilling records.
(3) To prevent wells from being drilled, operated, and produced in a man-
ner to cause injury to neighboring leases or property.
(4) To prevent the drowning by water of any stratum or part thereof capable
of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, and to prevent the premature and
irregular encroachment of water which reduces, or tends to reduce, the total
ultimate recovery of oil or gas from any pool.
(5) To require the operation of wells with efficient gas-oil ratios, and fix
these ratios.
(6) To prevent blow outs, caving and seepage in the sense that conditions
indicated by these terms are generally understood in the oil and gas business.
(7) To prevent fires.
(8) To identify the ownership of all oil or gas wells, producing leases,
refineries, tanks, plants, structures, and all storage and transportation equipment
and facilities.
(9) To regulate the shooting and chemical treatment of wells.
(10) To regulate secondary recovery methods, including the introduction of
gas, air, water, or other substance into producing formations.
(11) To limit and prorate the production of oil or gas or both from any pool
or field for the prevention of waste.
(12) To require, either generally or in or from particular areas, certificates
of clearance or tenders in connection with the transportation of oil, gas, or any
product.
(13) To regulate the spacing of wells and to establish drilling units, including
temporary or tentative spacing rules and drilling units in new fields.
(14) To require interested persons to place uniform meters of a type approved
by the commissioner wherever the commissioner designates on all pipelines, gather-
ing systems, barge terminals, loading racks, refineries, or other places necessary
or proper to prevent waste and the transportation of illegally produced oil or gas.
(15) To require that the product of all wells shall be separated into so many
million cubic feet of gaseous hydrocarbons and barrels of liquid hydrocarbons,
either or both, and accurately measured wherever separation takes place.
(16) To regulate by rules, the drilling, casing, cementing, disposal interval,
monitoring, plugging and permitting of disposal wells which are used to inject
waste products in the subsurface and to regulate all surface and storage waste
facilities incidental to oil and gas exploration and production, in such a manner
as to prevent the escape of waste product into a fresh ground water aquifer or
into oil or gas strata; and may require reasonable bond with security for the
performance of the duty to plug each abandoned well or each well which is of
no further use. . ..
(17) To regulate the construction design and operation of pipelines trans-
mitting carbon dioxide to serve secondary and tertiary recovery projects for in-
COMMENT
this power to the Commissioner relieves the legislature of the respon-
sibility of providing for all contingencies and recognizes the practical
problems associated with growth and development in the state's oil
and gas industry.' Orders are issued by the Commissioner following
a public hearing wherein testimony and evidence are presented sup-
porting the respective positions of the various interested parties-all
interested persons are entitled to be heard.' After considering all
available geological and engineering evidence, the Commissioner makes
findings of fact and issues an order furthering any one of the numerous
provisions of title 30.1'
Forms of Judicial Review
Because of their nature, orders of the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion necessarily affect various parties' rights in valuable natural
resources, and the orders often involve immense sums of money. Con-
sequently, a person unsatisfied with the Commissioner's determina-
tion may wish to dispute the Commissioner's order. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 49:964,11 part of the Administrative Procedure Act, and Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 30:12,1 part of the Conservation Act, provide
two parallel and coexisting forms of judicial review, each separate
and dissimilar to the other."3 Differences existing between the two
statutes may influence the strategy of a potential plaintiff." First,
under the two statutes, different persons may be entitled to bring
the action." Second, the relief sought under the two statutes differs-a
creasing the ultimate recovery of oil or gas, including the issuance of certificates
of public convenience and necessity for pipelines serving such projects ....
Additionally, the Commissioner is required to make rules, regulations, and orders
in certain necessary circumstances. See LA. R.S. 30:4(D), (E), (I). (Supp. 1980).
8. See Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942); see also O'Meara v.
Union Oil Co., 212 La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506 (1947).
9. LA. R.S. 30:8 (1950).
10. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 30:5(C) (1950); LA. R.S. 30:10(A) (1950).
11. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1966).
12. LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950).
13. Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d 389, 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
14. Although dissimilar in most respects, the statutes share an exclusive venue
provision. Under LA. R.S. 49:964, the district court of the parish in which the agency
is located is the proper place to institute a proceeding for judicial review of an
adjudication. See Force & Griffith, The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, 42
LA. L. REV. 1227, 1277-78 (1982). Similarly, LA. R.S. 30:12 expressly provides that
"Isluit shall be instituted in the district court of the parish in which the principal
office of the commissioner is located." Thus, under both statutes, suit must be brought
in East Baton Rouge Parish, the parish of the principal office of the Commissioner
of Conservation. See Theriot v. Mermentau Resources, Inc., 385 So. 2d 939 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980); Brown v. Alice-Sidney Oil Co., 343 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
15. Under LA. R.S. 49:964(A) (Supp. 1966), "[a] person who is aggrieved by a final
decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review." There
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30:12 action seeks injunctive relief, while a 49:964 action seeks judicial
review, i.e., it asks the court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency's
decision. 6 Third, the scope of review under 49:964 is confined to the
is no statutory requirement that all administrative remedies be exhausted; the aggrieved
person is entitled to judicial review regardless of "whether or not he has applied to
the agency for rehearing." Nonetheless, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doc-
trine has been applied to section 964, and the phrase "final decision" supports the
argument that all administrative remedies must be exhausted. See Romero v. Stephens,
359 So. 2d 1061 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Bonomo v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 337 So.
2d 553 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). However, the authorities cited in Bonomo did not in-
volve the statutory language contained in LA. R.S. 49:964, and they therefore are
distinguishable. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Ecology Center v.
Colemen, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975). Further, the statutory provision immediately
preceeding section 964, LA. R.S. 49:963, is contrary to section 964 and contains an
express requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Arguably, this reflects
an attempt to exclude this requirement from section 964. See also, Force & Griffith,
supra note 14, at 1276. Additionally, LA. R.S. 30:12 expressly requires the exhaus-
tion of all administrative remedies. See Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So. 2d 429 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1956). The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement supports the
Commissioner's authority to make findings of fact. See O'Meara v. Union Oil Co., 212
La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506 (1947).
The provisions of LA. R.S. 30:12 grant the right to obtain judicial review to an
interested person who has been adversely affected or threatened by a provision, rule,
regulation, order, or act of the Commissioner of Conservation. LA. R.S. 30:3(3) (1950)
defines "Person" to mean any natural person, corporation, association, partnership,
receiver, tutor, curator, executor, administrator, fiduciary, or representative of any
kind. In Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956), the court held that
landowners who have refused to sign "Unitization and Unit Operations Agreements"
and, thus are not affected by an order of the Commissioner of Conservation are not
"adversely affected" within the meaning of LA. R.S. 30:12. No jurisprudence defines
what makes a person "interested," but the provision may require that the person own
some interest in the subject of the dispute. ("Interested owners" and "interested par-
ties," as defined by Louisiana Comm'r of Conservation, Statewide Order 29-L (1976),
reprinted in HANDBOOK FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 29L(1) (6th ed. 1981) which deals
with the termination of units established by the Commissioner, require ownership of
some interest.)
16. The form of relief provided under LA. R.S. 49:964 is judicial review of the
agency decision. Immediate review is available only where a final agency decision would
not provide an adequate remedy and irreparable injury would result. LA. R.S.
49:964(A). See generally, Force & Griffith, supra note 14, at 1276-87.
The reviewing court may affirm or remand the case. Additionally, in certain cir-
cumstances the reviewing court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights
of the petitioning party have been prejudiced. LA. R.S. 49:964(G). Further, the statute
permits the reviewing court to issue a stay of enforcement upon appropriate terms.
LA. R.S. 49:964(C). In Division of Admin. v. Department of Civil Serv., 345 So. 2d 67
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), the court of appeal, in adopting guidelines pertaining to a
stay of an administrative order, expressly adopted and applied the standards set forth
in two federal cases. The first case was Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), in which the court listed four factors
to consider before granting or denying the request for a stay order: (1) Has the peti-
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record, while the scope of review is expanded under 30:12 which
authorizes review of all pertinent evidence." Despite their
dissimilarities, the two statutes are not mutually exclusive, and relief
may be sought under both.'8
Burdens of Proof
Another significant difference between the two statutes is their
respective burdens of proof. Under 49:964, the plaintiff may
demonstrate in a number of ways that his rights have been prejudiced
by an agency's decision. Prejudice may be evidenced by a violation
of a constitutional or statutory provision, by agency actions exceeding
statutory authority, by unlawful procedure, or by an error of law. 9
Further, the plaintiff may show that the agency's decision is arbitrary,
tioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal?
(2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief, it will be irreparably injured?
(3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the
proceedings? (4) Where lies public interest?
Additionally, the Louisiana court of appeal adopted standards used in Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
"A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result
to the appellant. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. The propriety of its issue
is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case." 345 So. 2d at 69 (quoting
Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted)).
LA. R.S. 30:12 allows a plaintiff to obtain court review of the Commissioner's order
and seek injunctive relief. This right of review is inclusive of all other remedies.
17. LA. R.S. 49:964(D) & (F) confine the review of the court "to the record"; the
agency is required to transmit the entire record to the reviewing court. However,
the reviewing court is permitted to order that the agency take additional evidence
if the additional evidence is material and good reasons are shown for failing to pre-
sent it in the original proceeding. LA. R.S. 49:964(E). Any modification by the agency
of its decisions by reason of the additional evidence is filed with the reviewing court.
LA. R.S. 30:12 allows the admission of "[aill pertinent evidence" with respect to
the validity and reasonableness of the order at issue. This indicates that the review-
ing court has the duty to determine the validity and reasonableness of the order and,
therefore, is obligated to give a full review to the facts of the particular case. See
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
18. Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). However, the argu-
ment can be made that LA. R.S. 49:964 and LA. R.S. 30:12 are mutually exclusive.
LA. R.S. 30:12 provides, inter alia, "The right of review accorded by this section shall
be inclusive of all other remedies ... " This phrase could be interpreted as excluding
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act when the plaintiff has already
sought relief under LA. R.S. 30:12. Such an interpretation, however, would conflict
with LA. R.S. 49:964(A), which provides judicial review "without limiting . . . utiliza-
tion of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review . . .
provided by law." Jordan v. Sutton described the two statutes as parallel and coex-
isting forms of judicial review, but it did not consider the language from LA. R.S.
30:12 which makes the right of review in LA. R.S. 30:12 inclusive of all other remedies.
19. LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(1)-(4).
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capricious, or characterized by an abusive or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion."
Finally, under 49:964, a plaintiff may show that the Commissioner's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are "manifestly
erroneous" in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record."' The statutory language incorporates the
"manifest error doctrine," thereby giving great weight to factual con-
clusions reached by the trier of fact and leaving undisturbed his
reasonable evaluations of credibility and inferences of fact,
notwithstanding the possibility of other reasonable evaluations.2" The
"manifest error doctrine" contained in section 964(G)(6) relates only
to factual findings of the trier of fact; it has no application to conclu-
sions of law or public policy.23 The doctrine is supported in the
statutory language which requires that due regard be given to the
agency's determination of credibility issues where the agency has the
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses by firsthand
observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court
does not.2'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12 expressly places the burden of
proof upon the plaintiff. Further, the provision, rule, regulation, or
order challenged by suit under 30:12 is given a presumption of validity
and taken as "prima facie valid"-a presumption not overcome by a
verified petition or affidavit." In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill,26 an attempt
to have an order of the Commissioner declared null failed because
of the presumption of validity attached to the order. The court of
appeal, quoting the trial judge, held that the presumption of validity
given to the Commissioner's order is appropriately applied "[wjhere
experts disagree, where proven facts show the existence of many
variables, [and] where reaching a fair balance involves incalculable
variants."' Gill was cited recently in Dunn v. Sutton,' wherein a claim
20. LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(5).
21. LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(6). For a discussion of the meaning of the phrases "substan-
tial evidence" and "the whole record," see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SS 29.02,
29.03 (3d ed. 1972).
22. See LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(6) (Supp. 1966).
23. Insurance Serv. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979).
24. LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(6).
25. See Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Dunn v. Sutton,
378 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Miller v. Menefee, 228 So. 2d 689 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1969); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
26. 194 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ denied, 250 La. 176, 194 So. 2d
738 (1967).
27. 194 So. 2d at 355.
28. 378 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
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for injunctive relief seeking to include the plaintiffs land within a
unit previously established by the Commissioner was rejected because
of the plaintiffs failure to carry his burden of proving the order to
be arbitrary and capricious.
Even though the Commissioner is presumed as a matter of law
to have acted in good faith,' the order's presumption of validity is
not conclusive. However, courts have refused to substitute their discre-
tion or judgment for that of the Commissioner in the absence of
evidence showing the Commissioner's action to be arbitrary."0 In ad-
dition to reducing congestion in the courts, this presumption allows
an administrative officer, familiar with technical complexities, to pro-
vide a proper resolution of the dispute before him." The high burden
of proof imposed by the order's presumption of validity has never
been overcome, consequently making challenges few in number.32
Theory of Laches
Perhaps the most significant difference between 49:964 and 30:12
is the time limit for review. Proceedings for review under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 49:964 must be brought within thirty days after the
mailing of notice of the final agency decision. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:12, however, contains no similar provision-as a judicial
response, the doctrine of laches has been applied to determine
timeliness of review under this statute. 3 Consequently, the absence
of a time limitation on an action brought under 30:12 may mean that
an order of the Commissioner of Conservation can be attacked at any
time, subject only to the application of laches. 34
Recent Application of Laches to Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12
The initial application of laches in a 30:12 action is found in Jor-
dan v. Sutton,31 wherein under the authority of 30:12, the plaintiff-
29. See Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961); see also Dunn
v. Sutton, 378 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
30. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Hussey, 234 La. 1058, 102 So. 2d 455 (1958); O'Meara
v. Union Oil Co., 212 La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506 (1947); Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97,
11 So. 2d 495 (1942); Dunn v. Sutton, 378 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ denied, 250 La. 179,
194 So. 2d 738 (1967); see Miller v. Menefee, 228 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
31. Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942); see also O'Meara v. Union
Oil Co., 212 La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506 (1947).
32. See McCollum, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Loui-
siana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 865 (1976).
33. Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
34. See Martin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Mineral Law, 42 LA. L. REV.
374, 378-81 (1982).
35. 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). Notably, laches recently was applied
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landowner sought to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Com-
missioner establishing an underground gas storage area on his
property." The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, on original
hearing, found that it was "manifestly unjust or inequitable" to apply
laches and overruled the exception. Although noting that laches had
been applied in contexts other than the judicial review of conserva-
tion orders, 7 the court expressly recognized the absence of any cases
applying laches to actions for the review of orders of the Commis-
sioner of Conservation under 30:12.1 However, on rehearing, the court
reversed its position and held that the doctrine of laches was applicable
in an action under 30:12.3' The court stated that laches served as a
bar to a plaintiff's action when no set term for the appeal of an ad-
ministrative ruling was required by statute and when the plaintiff
failed to appeal within a reasonable time. ° The first circuit remanded
the case to the trial court, where the judge determined sixty days
to be the "reasonable" period of time in which a plaintiff could bring
a suit under 30:12.
41
The exception of laches is based on the plaintiffs failure to bring
an action for judicial review within a reasonable time-it is an
equitable doctrine exercised within the court's discretion, with each
case determination resting upon its particular set of circumstances
and controlled by equitable considerations. 2 Louisiana courts often
have stated that laches
is based on the injustice that might result from the enforcement
to bar an action brought under the authority of LA. R.S. 30:12. Carbello v. Sutton,
No. 249,645 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 16, 1982). Relying on the authority of Jordan
v. Sutton, the trial judge refused to set a precise time in which to institute a LA.
R.S. 30:12 action and simply held that the plaintiffs action, which was commenced
within the 60 day period for devolutive appeals, was barred by laches. Defining the
court's sole function to be to determine (1) whether there was unreasonable delay in
bringing the suit, and (2) whether allowing the suit would result in injury, the trial
judge expressed the following: "The fixing of a prescribed time for bringing an action
is peculiarly and exclusively within the control and authority of the legislature."
36. Id. at 390.
37. 401 So. 2d at 393 (citing State ex rel Koehl v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 179
La. 117, 153 So. 533 (1934)).
38. 401 So. 2d at 393.
39. Id. at 393-94.
40. Id.
41. Jordan v. Sutton, No. 237,861 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 17, 1981), on remand
from 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
42. See Labarre v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946); Fontenot v. State
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 341 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Molero v. Bass, 322 So.
2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Knight v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
195 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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of long neglected rights, the difficulty, if not the impossibility,
of ascertaining the truth of the matters in controversy and doing
justice between the parties, and on grounds of public policy, its
aim being the discouragement, for the peace and repose of society,
of stale and antiquated demands.43
It should not be invoked to defeat justice; rather, it should be applied
only where the enforcement of an asserted right would work injustice."
In Jordan,45 the court of appeal clearly defined two elements
necessary to establish that a plaintiff has been "guilty" of laches."
First, there must be unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff
in filing suit. Second, it must be shown that a harm or prejudice will
be suffered by either the defendant or a third party. This harm will
result because the defendant or some third party has acted on the
reasonable assumption, occasioned by the delay, that the plaintiff
would not seek further legal redress. 7
"Unreasonable delay" was not defined in the court of appeal's opin-
ion because the record was considered incomplete on the issue of
laches.48 Although further testimony and receipt of evidence was per-
mitted on remand, an apparent balancing by the court of appeal was
evident in the opinion. On the one hand, the plaintiff had delayed for
fifteen months. On the other hand, mitigating circumstances existed.
First, the record contained testimony by the plaintiff that communica-
tions by the Commissioner had led him to believe that the contested
order would be set aside without any need to bring an action. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiffs change of counsel during the fifteen month
period may have accounted for some of the delay. What constitutes
"unreasonable delay" remains unresolved, yet, notably, the trial court
on remand determined that the Commissioner had not misled the
plaintiff.49
Similarly, the degree of harm or prejudice required to merit the
application of laches was not defined by the court of appeal in Jor-
dan. The case was remanded to determine whether any prejudice had
resulted to a third party, the intervenor constructing a gas storage
area over the plaintiff's land. Whether the Commissioner individually
43. Labarre v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 51, 26 So. 2d 279, 285 (1946).
44, Id.; Shirey v. Campbell, 151 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
45. Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 393.
47. See State ex rel. McCabe v. Police Bd., 107 La. 162, 31 So. 662 (1902); Knight
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 195 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
48. 401 So. 2d at 394.
49. Jordan v. Sutton, No. 237,861 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dec. 17, 1981).
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could suffer prejudice was not addressed by the court of appeal, 0 but
the application of laches "in and of itself in view of the nature and
effect of the orders of the Commissioner" was rejected.
On remand, the trial judge found that a variety of interests would
suffer harm. First, lack of finality in the Commissioner's orders would
place the Office of Conservation in disarray. Second, the trial judge
feared that orderly operation of the oil and gas industry in the state
of Louisiana would be damaged in contravention of the public interest.
Additionally, prejudice would be suffered by a third party who had
intervened in the case having undertaken a project with expenditures
in excess of $100 million, a large portion of which had been spent
based on the opinion of counsel that the Commissioner's order was
final. Finally, the taxpayers would suffer harm in the form of loss
of jobs and facilities and an additional loss if tax deductible losses
suffered by the third party resulted in lower tax revenues.
Generally, because the applicability of laches is within the discre-
tion of the court, each case should rest upon its own particular set
of circumstances.2 Yet, the reasoning of the trial judge in Jordan in-
dicates that sixty days would be an appropriate limit in all conserva-
tion suits because of the nature of the Commissioner's orders. The
full import of this ruling is unclear; however, it appears that Loui-
siana now allows the application of laches in 30:12 actions.
Procedural Characterization of Laches
The potential use of laches in conservation practice makes evi-
dent the need for its procedural characterization. Conceived in com-
mon law courts of equity, laches is foreign to Louisiana courts of law.
Understandably puzzled, Louisiana courts have characterized it as an
affirmative defense' and a peremptory exception' and sometimes have
50. Laches barred a suit by a tenured bus driver seeking to recover unpaid salary
following the discontinuace of his schiool bus route. The delay in bringing the action
was less than one year, and it was found to cause "disadvantage to public administra-
tion and the public fisc." Arrington v. Grant Parish School Bd., 130 So. 2d 443, 445
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). This decision supports the argument that unreasonable delay
can prejudice the Commissioner of Conservation by impeding public administration
and wasting public funds.
51. 401 So. 2d at 394.
52. See Fontenot v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 341 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976); Molero v. Bass, 322 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Knight v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 195 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Labarre v.
Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946).
53. See cases cited in note 61, infra.
54. Barnett v. DeVelle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974); Kachelmyer v. Ames, 335 So.
2d 525 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Miller v. East Ascension Tel. Co., 331 So. 2d 182 (La.
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labeled it simply a plea,5 a defense,' or an exception.57 Federal courts
characterize laches as an affirmative defense, 8 and failing to proper-
ly plead it may constitute a waiver. 9 Likewise, most states
characterize laches as an affirmative defense."
Despite this cloudy jurisprudence, Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 1005 has been interpreted to include laches within Loui-
siana's list of affirmative defenses,"' which are waived unless special-
ly pleaded.2 Further, references by Louisiana courts to the doctrine
of "estoppel by laches"63 and references in other states to laches as
a creature of estoppel 4 support the inclusion of laches within the
App. 1st Cir. 1976); Dunbar v. Griffin, 331 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Albritton
v. Union Parish School Bd., 307 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
55. Dixon v. Adler, 250 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Port Arthur Towing
Co. v. LeVeque, 247 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); American Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Twenty Grand Towing Co., 225 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Vallee v. Vallee,
180 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
56. Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974); Fontenot v. Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 341 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Stansbury v. City of Opelousas,
341 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
57. For a discussion of laches as an exception, see Barnett v. DeVelle, 289 So.
2d 129 (La. 1974); Jordan v. Sutton; Molero v. Bass, 322 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975); DeVillier v. City of Opelousas, 247 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); Organizations United for Ecology v. Bell, 446 F. Supp.
535 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Miller v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Lasseigne
v. Nigerian Gulf Oil Co., 397 F. Supp. 465 (D. Del. 1975).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). But see Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
in which the court held that there had been no waiver of the defense of laches because
one does not plead to a motion for enforcement of a consent decree and if no pleading
is required or permitted, there is no waiver. See also LA. CODE Civ. P. art, 1005.
60. ALA. R. Civ. P. 8(c); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 8(d); COLO. R. Civ. P. 8(c); IDAHO R. CIv.
P. 8(c); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 2-613(d) (1982); IND. R. TR. P. 8(c); KAN. CIV. PROC.
CODE ANN. S 60-208(c) (Weeks 1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.03; ME. R. Civ. P. 8(c); MASS.
R. CIV. P. 8(c); MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.03; Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 8(c); NEV.
R. Civ. P. 8(c); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:5-4; N.M. R. Civ. P. 8(c); N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(c); N.D.
R. Civ. P. 8(c); OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(c); OR. R. Civ. P. 19(B); PA. R. Civ. P. 1030; R.I. R.
Civ. P. 8(c); S.D.C.L. 15-6-8(c); TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.03; TEX. R. CIv. P. 94; UTAH R. Civ.
P. 8(c); VT. R. Civ. P. 8(c); WASH. REV. CODE S 8(c) (1974); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8(c); WIS.
R. Civ. P. 802.02(3); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
61. New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 263 La.
649, 269 So. 2d 194 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973); Harris Paint Co. v. Quinn
Constr., 282 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); British Am. Oil Producing Co. v. Griz-
zaffi, 135 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of
Trustees, Teachers' Retirement Sys., 29 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
62. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1005.
63. Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974); Barnett v. DeVelle,
289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974); Jackson v. St. Landry Parish School Sys., 407 So. 2d 51
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); DeVillier v. City of Opelousas, 247 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
64. See Sears v. Berryman, 101 Idaho 843, 623 P.2d 455 (1981); McDaniel v. Messer-
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"estoppel" language of Louisiana's list of affirmative defenses in article
1005. Additionally, laches may be included within the omnibus provi-
sion of the article ("extinguishment of the obligation in any manner"),
as comment (e) provides:
Certain common law concepts enumerated as affirmative defenses
in Fed. Rule 8(c), such as accord and satisfaction, laches, license,
and waiver, have been recognized and adopted in varying degrees
by the jurisprudence of Louisiana. They have not been expressly
included in the enumeration although to the extent that these con-
cepts are recognized in our jurisprudence they are included within
the omnibus phrase "any other matter constituting an affirmative
defense."
Laches has no legal basis as an exception of no right of action,"5 and
it is not based on prescription."6 As an affirmative defense, laches may
be raised by the exception of no cause of action. 7
The laches exception may require a hearing on the merits. 8 Jor-
dan, the only reported authority for applying laches in 30:12 actions,
was remanded to the trial court for consideration of further evidence,
indicating that the question of laches should be determined at the
trial and upon all the evidence.
chmidt, 191 Kan. 461, 382 P.2d 304 (1963); Boyd v. Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 28 Md. App. 18, 344 A.2d 148 (1975); Iriart v. Johnson, 75 N.M. 745, 411 P.2d
226 (1965); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 31 Pa. Commw.
212, 375 A.2d 890 (1977); State ex rel. Randall v. Snohomish County, 79 Wash. 2d 619,
488 P.2d 511 (1971); Saric v. Brlos, 247 Wis. 400, 19 N.W.2d 903 (1945).
65. State ex rel. Guste v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975).
66. DeVillier v. City of Opelousas, 247 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
67. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana, 9 TUL. L. REV.
17 (1934). See West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 26 So. 2d 221 (1946); see also Jenkins v. A.R.
Blossman, Inc., 60 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952).
68. In Labarre v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946), the laches exception
sustained at trial was reversed on appeal because there had been no trial on the merits.
The Labarre court noted that earlier cases considered all of the evidence that could
possibly be produced by the proponents of the stale claim and applied the doctrine
of laches after a hearing on the merits. See Kuhn v. Bercher, 114 La. 602, 38 So. 468
(1905); Wood v. Egan, 39 La. Ann. 684, 2 So. 191 (1887). While recognizing the apparent
indication that a trial on the merits is required to sustain a plea of laches, the court
in Molero v. Bass, 322 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), expressed some hesitation
in following this requirement; nevertheless, it finally decided that a trial on the merits
may be needed. Federal courts have exercised "caution" before applying laches on
summary judgment. See Powell v. City of Key West, 434 F.2d 1075, 1080 (5th Cir.




Underlying Issue of Finality
For several reasons, laches is an unworkable solution to the prob-
lem of timeliness of review under 30:12. First, the doctrine fails to
address the underlying need for finality in conservation orders. The
focus of laches is upon two elements: (1) the actions of the complain-
ing party, and (2) the prejudice which would result from disturbing
an order of the Commissioner of Conservation.69 Because the time for
seeking review is limited only upon demonstrating both unreasonable
delay and prejudice, once it is shown that disturbing the order would
result in prejudice, the unreasonableness of the plaintiffs delay
becomes decisive. Unfortunately, this inquiry ignores the very essence
of the problem, that is, the finality of conservation orders. To illustrate
this point, assume the plaintiff in Jordan, rather than waiting 15
months to commence his action for review, had instituted his suit im-
mediately upon discovering a condition which had silently continued
for 15 months before manifesting itself. Under these facts, the degree
of prejudice which would be suffered by someone relying on the order
parallels that suffered in the original circumstances, yet the element
of unreasonableness is absent. As laches is presently the only limita-
tion on a 30:12 action, a conservation order can be attacked whenever
it is shown that the plaintiffs delay in seeking review was not
unreasonable.
If the aim of the Jordan court was to prevent prejudice to people
relying on the Commissioner's orders, its use of laches will fall short
of the mark. By examining both prejudice and the unreasonableness
of the plaintiffs delay, orders issued by the Commissioner of Conser-
vation may never become final, always being susceptible of judicial
review, at least to the extent that the plaintiffs actions in delaying
his suit for injunction were not unreasonable.
The fallacy of applying laches as a limitation on the time for seek-
ing review of conservation orders lies in separating the inquiry into
its two elements, unreasonable delay and prejudice to the defendant
or a third party. It is submitted that in examining unreasonableness,
the actions of the plaintiff should not be determinative; rather, the
prejudice which would result from an untimely review of the order
should be determinative. Indeed, in contesting an order, the element
of prejudice, in and of itself, should make any delay unreasonable.
69. Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d at 394.
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Anyone having relied on an order by the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion has little interest in whether someone now seeking to question
that order was reasonable in delaying the appeal; instead his interests
demand a definite answer to one question: "When can I rely on this
order?"
Perhaps the ultimate inquiry should focus on the issue underlying
the problem, specifically, whether a point in time can ever be
established after which orders of the Commissioner of Conservation
become final and unquestionable. In attempting to answer this query,
a balancing of several interests is necessary. First, lack of finality
emasculates the Commissioner's order, seriously undermining the pur-
pose and function of the Office of Conservation."0 Conservation orders
form the basis for legal opinions and business decisions; without
finality, the orders become meaningless. So long as the possibility of
court review exists, it remains seriously questionable whether anyone
can reasonably rely on an order issued by the Commissioner.
Moreover, conservation orders greatly impact land titles, and the
public records doctrine mandates that clear title be ascertainable and
that reliance on the public records be protected." Magnifying the pro-
blem even further are the large sums of money characteristically in-
volved in the exploration for and development and production of
minerals. In sum, lack of finality breeds instability in the all-important
areas of property, oil, gas, and mineral law, thereby creating chaos
and confusion, impeding industrial growth, and disrupting the economy.
Review of Court and Agency Decisions
Historically, laches has been applied to bar the untimely institu-
tion of an original action." An action under 30:12, on the other hand,
is not an original action-it is in the nature of an appeal. Attaching
finality to a conservation order does not deprive the plaintiff of a
remedy because he already has received an administrative hearing.
Granting finality to the order only serves to limit the time in which
the plaintiff is permitted to seek judicial review of that agency's deter-
mination. Thus it is more consistent to apply the rules for appellate
70. See generally LA. R.S. 36:358(C) (Supp. 1975); LA. R.S. 30:4(C) (1950). The Loui-
siana Mineral Code recognizes the effect of conservation orders by allowing unitiza-
tion to serve as an interruption of the ten year prescriptive period for nonuse. LA.
R.S. 31:33 (1974).
71. See State v. Cenac, 341 La. 1055, 132 So. 2d 928 (1961).
72. However, State ex rel. Koehl v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 179 La. 117, 153 So.
533 (1934), applied laches to a suit for judicial review of an action of the New Orleans
Sewerage and Water Board. See Jordan v. Sutton, 401 So. 2d at 393.
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delays to 30:12, rather than limitations on original actions, such as
prescription or laches. In comparison, the delay periods for appealing
judicial decisions are based on the principle that there must be some
point in time after which a party's failure to exercise his right of
court review will result in the loss of that right. Parties are not per-
mitted to delay indefinitely in the exercise of their rights." Our legal
system requires that the issues be resolved and that, once resolved,
they remain undisturbed.74
If analogized to court decisions, conservation orders would require
appeal within a similarly abbreviated period,75 with the failure to
timely perfect an appeal making the administrative determination final.
Despite the apparent temptation to view the two actions similarly,
a conservation hearing is not a judicial trial, and the order issued
by the Commissioner is not a judgment. In short, court decisions and
conservation orders simply are not the same animal.
Nonetheless, a review of the statutes concerning other ad-
ministrative agencies indicates a parallel favoritism in the law for short
time periods for seeking judicial review of administrative decisions.
For example, Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act provides that
proceedings for judicial review must be instituted within thirty days
after the mailing of notice of the final decisions"6 of boards, commis-
sions, agencies, and departments of the state's executive branch. 7
Additionally, Louisiana statutes. provide similar time limitations for
judicial review of rulings by numerous other bodies. 8 These brief time
periods reflect a consistent recognition by the legislature of a need
for finality in administrative decisions.
73. 5 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, PRESCRIPTION n' 29, as contained in
G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL (4th ed. 1924).
"Cicero correctly called it 'finis Solici tudinis ac periculi litium.' " Id.
74. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2286 & 3556(31).
75. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2123 sets the period in which to bring a suspensive
appeal at 30 days. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2087 sets the period in which to bring a
devolutive appeal at 60 days.
76. LA. R.S. 49:964(B).
77. LA. R.S. 49:951-49:970 (Supp. 1982).
78. A 30 day time limitation for judicial review is provided in the following situa-
tions: LA. R.S. 17:108 (Supp. 1960) (school boards); LA. CONST. art. X, S 12 (Civil Ser-
vice Commission); LA. R.S. 22:1360 (Supp. 1958) (Insurance Commission); LA. R.S.
32:414(E) (Supp. 1976) (Department of Transportation); LA. R.S. 42:1142(C) (Supp. 1980)
(Commission on Ethics for Public Employees); LA. R.S. 2:387 (1950) (airport zoning
boards). Further, an appeal of an order of the Department of Public Works must be
instituted within ten days, LA. R.S. 2:14 (1950), and judicial review of an assessment
by the Louisiana Office of Employment Security must be brought within ten days,
LA. R.S. 23:1728 (Supp. 1972).
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Finally, the Louisiana Surface Mining and Reclamation Act"9 and
the Natural Resources and Energy Act of 1973,"o both contained in
title 30, place thirty-day time limitations on actions for judicial review
of orders of the Commissioner of Conservation.81 These statutes sup-
port the application of the standard thirty-day period for seeking court
review of administrative decisions to actions for review under 30:12.
The absence of a time limitation within Louisiana Revised Statutes
30:12 could be the result of legislative oversight. The nature of relief
provided by 30:12 is uniquely injunctive. Perhaps the legislature in-
tended to allow the action to be brought at any time. However, the
parallel statute in the Administrative Procedure Act provides im-
mediate review when irreparable injury is sustained, rather than
illogically extending the time for instituting the action. 2 Arguably,
30:12 was intended to provide similar relief, i.e., relief of an exigent
nature, and the time for instituting such an action should be limited.
On the other hand, 30:12 may have been intended to provide relief
where the plaintiff is unaware of the injury during the standard thirty-
day period for review. Even under that construction, however, the
statute fails to limit the time in which the plaintiff must institute
the action once the injury becomes apparent. Further, if it were truly
the legislature's intent not to limit the time for seeking review, the
statute could have expressly allowed the action to be brought at any
time. Therefore, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to allow
a 30:12 action to be brought at any time.
The underlying need for finality in conservation orders provides
the justification for limiting the time for judicial review of such orders.
However, these orders are not always final. Pursuant to the power
delegated by title 30,8" the Commissioner of Conservation issued
Statewide Order 29-L, creating rules and regulations regarding the
termination of units established by order of the Commissioner." These
rules, providing for the issuance of supplemental orders for the ter-
79. LA. R.S. 30:926-30:932 (Supp. 1976 & 1978).
80. LA. R.S. 30:559-30:724 (Supp. 1973 & 1977).
81. See LA. R.S. 30:606 (Supp. 1973); LA. R.S. 30:926(A) (Supp. 1978 & 1979).
82. LA. R.S. 49:964(A) (Supp. 1966). See note 16, supra.
83. LA. R.S. 30:9.1 (Supp. 1975).
84. Louisiana Comm'r of Conservation, Statewide Order No. 29-L (issued and
effective on February 4, 1976), supra note 15, was issued by R.T. Sutton, former Com-
missioner of Conservation. A unit previously established by order of the Commissioner
may be terminated under Statewide Order No. 29-L upon a showing that one year
and ninety days have elapsed without production or the existence of a well capable
of producing and drilling, reworking, recompleting, deepening, or plugging back opera-
tions to restore production.
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mination of units previously established by order, apparently recognize
a need for flexibility. Changes and developments occurring in the oil
and gas industry may require a reevaluation of a previously
established unit. Statewide Order 29-L gives the Commissioner of Con-
servation the ability to terminate such a unit.
At first blush, it appears inconsistent to say that a conservation
order should be final for purposes of 30:12, but not final for purposes
of Statewide Order 29-L. Nevertheless, the two provisions clearly are
distinguishable. First, the application of Statewide Order 29-L is
limited to the termination of units previously established by order,
whereas 30:12 applies to all orders issued by the Commissioner. Not
all conservation orders establish units; they may be issued for other
reasons. s5 For example, in Jordan, the disputed order established a
gas storage area.
Moreover, court review of an order and a public hearing for the
issuance of a supplemental order involve different procedures con-
ducted for different purposes. Under 30:12, a reviewing court examines
the validity of the order, judging the resonableness of the Commis-
sioner's findings at the time of the hearing. The action is an appeal.
On the other hand, when the Commissioner acts under the authority
of Statewide Order 29-L, his original findings are not in dispute. In-
stead, the inquiry is whether, because of lack of production and opera-
tions, a supplemental order has become necessary to terminate the
previously established unit. Unlike 30:12, a hearing conducted under
the authority of Statewide Order 29-L is not an appeal. Analogized
to court procedures, 30:12 provides an appeal and Statewide Order
29-L provides a new trial. Therefore, the possibility of a hearing pur-
suant to Statewide Order 29-L should not be interpreted as under-
mining the need for finality in conservation orders.
Limiting the Period for Judicial Review
Extending Laches
After accepting the proposition that conservation orders should
at some point in time become final, the only remaining question is
how to limit the period for seeking judicial review. Laches is an in-
adequate limitation on the time period for instituting a 30:12 action
because it examines the reasonableness of the plaintiff's delay, rather
than focusing exclusively on the prejudice which could result from
disturbing the order's finality. However, laches could resolve the prob-
lem if a judicial determination were made establishing some period
85. See LA. R.S. 30:4(C) (Supp. 1979). See note 7, supra.
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of time after which any delay by a plaintiff would be unreasonable
per se. The trial judge in Jordan, recognizing the necessity of finality,
apparently employed this approach, stating that "anything in excess
of 60 days would be unreasonable because there must be finality, par-
ticularly on orders such as this."86 This reasoning is consistent with
the conclusion that the absence of a time limitation in 30:12 is the
result of legislative oversight.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:15
On the other hand, perhaps the absence of a time limit in 30:12
is not merely the product of legislative oversight; arguably, the time
limit may be governed by another provision within the chapter. A
resolution of the problem may be found in the interpretation of Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 30:15, which provides:
In proceedings brought under authority of, or for the purpose of
contesting the validity of, a provision of this Chapter, or of an
oil or gas conservation law of this state, or of a rule, regulation,
or order issued thereunder, appeals may be taken in accordance
with the general laws relating to appeals. In appeals from
judgments or decrees in suits to contest the validity of a provi-
sion of this Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the commissioner
hereunder, the appeals when docketed in the proper appellate
court shall be placed on the preference docket of the court and
may be advanced as the court directs.87
It has been submitted that the word "proceedings" in the first
sentence of 30:15 properly includes actions under 30:12.88 Arguably,
to seek court review of an order by the Commissioner is to appeal
the order. In short, this argument urges that 30:12 provides the right
of review and 30:15 specifies the timing and further manner of an
appeal to a court. Supporting this argument is the common usage of
the words "appeal" and "review" by the legislature and the courts. 8
If accepted, this interpretation of 30:15 would apply the general rules
for appeals to 30:12 actions, i.e., thirty days for a suspensive appeal"
and sixty days for a devolutive appeal."
86. Jordan v. Sutton, No. 237,861 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 17, 1981), on remand
from 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
87. LA. R.S. 30:15 (1950) (emphasis added).
88. Martin, supra note 34, at 379-81.
89. Id. at 380-81.
90. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2123.
91. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2087.
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However, 30:15 may be interpreted so as to reach the opposite
conclusion. The last sentence of 30:12 provides: "The right of review
accorded by this Section shall be inclusive of all other remedies, but
the right of appeal shall lie as hereinafter set forth in this Chapter."
Arguably, this language presents a clear distinction between two
separate "rights": (1) the right to review under section 12, and (2)
the right to appeal as set forth in section 15. It follows that 30:15
does not control the period for review under 30:12. Rather, 30:15 ap-
plies the general rules of appeal to the subsequent appeal of the
reviewing court's judgment on the merits of the 30:12 action. This
argument supports the proposition that the absence of a time limita-
tion in 30:12 is the result of legislative oversight. In any event, the
abbreviated periods for appeal supplied by 30:15 reflect the need for
a final determination.
Legislative Correction
A legislative amendment to 30:12 would produce a preferable solu-
tion to the problem. Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12 could be
amended to provide either a definite period of time in which to seek
court review or an expression of the legislature's intent to allow the
action to be commenced at any time. The former would resolve pre-
sent uncertainties and provide a definite period of time after which
conservation orders would become final and nonappealable. Since the
absence of a time limitation in 30:12 appears to be the result of
legislative oversight, legislative correction of the problem is the most
tenable solution.
Conclusion
Judicial review of orders issued by the Commissioner of Conser-
vation presently may be sought under the authority of both Louisiana
Revised Statutes 49:964 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12. These
statutes differ with respect to who may bring an action, the form
of relief the reviewing court may grant, the scope of the evidence
considered by the reviewing court, and the standards on the burden
of proof. Further, while conservation orders are subject to judicial
review under 49:964 for only thirty days, 30:12 is devoid of any express
statutory period for review, review thereunder being limited only by
the recent application of laches. The application of laches, however,
is inconsistent with the definite delay periods provided for the review
of decisions by courts and other administrative agencies, and it is un-
workable to the extent that it ignores the underlying need for finali-
ty of conservation orders.
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The successful functioning of the state's Office of Conservation
depends to a large degree on the effectiveness of the Commissioner's
orders. The continuing threat of subsequent court review destroys
the credibility which these orders demand. In short, the growing need
to conserve Louisiana's natural resources requires that a definite point
in time be established after which orders issued by the Commissioner
of Conservation become final.
Finality could be achieved under the present use of laches if a
judicial determination established some definite length of delay to be
unreasonable per se. Alternatively, the rules governing appeals under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:15 could be interpreted to include covrt
review under 30:12. However, the ultimate responsibility rests upon
the legislature to correct the apparent oversight in 30:12 which has
created such uncertainty.
Raymond Lloyd Brown, Jr.
